We can infer from here that the possession of this faculty involves an attitude that is reflected on two levels closely linked to each other: on the one hand, the strength of mind immune to insufficient forms of knowledge, and, on the other, as a consequence of the previous one, staying away from the deception of appearances. These terms seem, then, to allude to an intellectual virtue closely connected with the character of the “skêpsis” that recognizes in the Pyrrhonic philosopher a nobility of spirit that undoubtedly has its origin in Pyrrho. This idea delimits a precise ethical-intellectual disposition, which evokes a particular style of philosophy and philosopher. A type of philosopher who, while requiring a body of principles (not dogmatic in character) to inform action and knowledge, behaves with “generosity” and “spiritual elevation” (Text 24).
This is the secret of the exceptionality of the wise Pyrrho, of the meaning of the things that are in the world. It is an indifference that has nothing to do with inactivity, nor with ethical indifference. Rather, we are faced with a coherent conception in which, denying any objective reality (be it on the ontological or moral plane), he still believes in the possibility of a phenomenal relationship, translated on the plane of empirical life that covers a concept in accordance with life. This initiatory relationship will then be the main reason for Sexto’s technical skepticism, the precise and fundamental concept of adaptation to the phenomenon, finds a considerable Pyrrhian historical antecedent.
Thus, we observe in Pyrrho a certain imperturbability of mind as a consequence of his attitude towards the knowledge of things: there is a certain parallel between his theories and his life, adjusting in such a way that his life was consistent with his theoretical project. This argument, loaded with all the previous philosophical tradition, has as a consequence the abandonment, in its theoretical attitude towards the nature of things, of speculative philosophy, incompatible with peace of mind, and the acceptance of practical orientation as a requirement essential of any later skeptical reflections (Text 25).
Therefore, it is not uncommon for Pyrrho to feel a certain rejection of the speculation that philosophy had reached, since none of the theories he knows is capable of solving the problems of the individual, so little by little he tends more towards an attitude practical life, than a theoretical attitude about it.